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Kyrgyz Political Economy: moral reflections 




Since the transition to a market economy, Kyrgyz citizens have had to negotiate the shifting demands of the market, family, community and the state as they strive to attain a socially dignified existence. Unsurprisingly, tensions and contradictions have arisen as the market principle of ‘paying for things’ has been extended to social activities strictly outside ‘the market’ such as policing, education and friendship; often this is referred to as 'corruption'. Indeed, individuals are evaluating the boundaries of the market sphere, assessing its limits, and judging its liberating and destructive effects on other social spheres (cf. Walzer 1983). They imagine a 'moral economy', faltering under the pressures of the market system (cf. Thompson 1971). As Sayer (2000a) notes, the economy embodies norms, conventions, and tacit understanding regarding the responsibilities and rights of individuals and institutions with respect to others, and regarding the nature and qualities of goods and services.




Kyrgyz Political Economy: moral reflections 
on the transformations of the society

Introduction
Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia, formerly part of the Soviet Union until its break-up in December 1991, has undergone deep structural changes in how it organises production, distribution and consumption. In common with most post-socialist countries, the state has embraced 'the market economy', and indeed in 1998, it joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), whose members have to satisfy the prerequisite of implementing market principles throughout the economy. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan was the first country in Central Asia to join the WTO with much official fanfare and joyous chorus at diplomatic and governmental levels. Yet, unsurprisingly, most ordinary individuals are appalled at how the market has impacted upon their own daily lives, their access to various vital social goods and their personal relationships with family and friends (see Dudwick, Gomart, Marc and Kuehnast 2002; Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002 and Green and Bauer 1998). More generally in post-socialist countries, many writers (see Pickles and Smith 1998) have commented on the mishandling of privatisation programmes and the corruption and incompetence of government officials and politicians. Some writers (such as Humphrey 2002; Narayan, Chambers, Shah and Petesch 2000; Naraya, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher and Koch-Schulte 2000) discuss in detail how ordinary individuals have interpreted the economic changes, and what, if anything, they do to resist such changes. Drawing upon these studies, this report shows that individuals imagine a 'moral economy', faltering under the pressures of the market, as the mentality of 'paying for things' embeds itself into the social fabric of the society. 
'Moral economy' refers to three inter-related meanings: 
a)	a range of legitimate tradable things (see Walzer 1983; Thompson 1971); 
b)	a broad set of relationships and practices defining social responsibilities and moral obligations in the civil society (see Sayer 2000a; Wolfe 1989); and 
c)	a sense of economic disempowerment, social dispossession and moral outrage as a result of the over-extension of the market (see Keat 2000; Humphrey 2002) 
Liberal advocates of the market (e.g., the Adam Smith Institute, Institute of Economic Affairs and International Monetary Fund) argue that the transition to a market economy empowers individuals to make decisions, and gives them the choice and freedom to produce and consume, as the economy as a whole moves from planned controls to market signals. Critics of the market (e.g., Bourdieu 1998) point out that real markets disempower, frustrate and anger individuals, failing to deliver the promised ideals and hopes of the market economy, and creating social injustices and economic inequalities (White 1993; Mackintosh 1990; Harriss-White 1996). Both of these accounts imply a wholesale commodification of the society, giving little attention to what particular social goods individuals are producing and consuming, and how individuals judge them. 
Avoiding the pitfalls of idolising or demonising the market, Walzer (1983) discusses how different social spheres of relations and practices (such as the market, friendship, education, medical care and media) require different organising principles. Individuals evaluate the appropriateness and legitimacy of extending one organising principle (such as the market principle of exchange of goods and accumulation of money) to other social spheres. As Humphrey (2002) points out, in many areas of the society, a sense of dispossession has occurred as a result of the dominance of the organising principle of the market, transplanting the tyrannical regime of the Soviet Union to become the new oppressor. In addition, some writers (such as Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002; Dudwick, Gomart, Marc and Kuehnast 2002; Green and Bauer 1998; Marsh 1996; Pilkington 1996) have pointed to how the market economy has engendered social changes, resulting in many women enduring harsh employment practices, sexual trafficking, poor medical care and education, and fragmented social networking. For many women the market has deeply penetrated into their lives, and made them powerless and vulnerable.
Various studies (e.g., Narayan and Petesch 2002; Anderson and Pomfret 2000; Namazie 2002; Green and Bauer 1998) have been conducted to assess social welfare and living standards during the transition to a market economy in Kyrgyzstan since 1991. Overwhelmingly, they have found that there has been a negative impact on the economy with unemployment increasing, industrial output falling, and poverty growing as the collapse of the central planning system resulted in damaged trade links with Russia, lost markets, a wave of bankruptcy of large state-owned factories, a smaller public budget to finance social expenditure, and a breakdown in payment mechanisms. Green and Bauer (1998: 357) suggest that the incidence of poverty increased from 20% to 49% between 1989 and 1996, affecting the rural population most severely. 
The World Bank (2000) points out that the nature of poverty in post-socialist countries is distinct from developing countries in Africa and South Asia. Most of the poor in transition countries are well educated, and before the collapse of the Soviet Union, they had secure employment, regular pensions and social allowances from the state, a set of social rights and access to health, education and leisure. Rotoklya (2002) also notes that 'the new poor' in post-socialist countries experience a great degree of social insecurity, endure unaccustomed economic hardship and are excluded or marginalised from social networks and support as previous social conventions and normal patterns of life are disrupted. The World Bank sums the chronic nature of the new poor:
Their sense of personal failure, together with the loss of respected social roles and identities, frequently have produced a paralysing sense of shame. This has contributed to self-destructive responses such as alcoholism, depression and even suicide. Poverty has greatly increased social stress.
[World Bank 2000:33]
Whilst the high incidence of poverty sets the moral affects of the transition to a market economy in context, in our research we do not examine its facts, causes and consequences. Indeed, the concept of 'poverty' is theoretically distinct from our concept of 'moral economy'. However, as we shall see, poverty does colour how people make moral judgements about the market system.
In this report we discuss how individuals judge their moral economy, in particular evaluating the boundaries of the market sphere and assessing its limits; i.e., their understanding of the consequences of extending the market principle of paying for things on relationships and practices in various social spheres such as policing, education and friendship. We do not examine how individuals come to negotiate the different organising principles, especially regarding their sense of social obligations and responsibilities in the face of the dominance of market logic. We hope to address this issue in another report. 
The report is structured as follows. In the next section, we suggest how the market system can both civilise and liberate social relationships, as well as cause destruction and corrosion of social rules, conventions, and obligations, leading to a rise in corruption. The research design of the project and how it was conducted is described in the third section. The fourth section discusses the findings, structuring it into two parts as individuals assess the positive and negative aspects of the market organising principle. We also draw upon studies of corruption in Kyrgyzstan to assess the negative effects of the transition to a market economy. While many writers (e.g., Pickles and Smith1998) explore the market transition in terms of privatisation, housing, labour migration, industrial organisation and international trade, we also consider how intimate and personal relationships have been transformed. Using the study of Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002), we suggest that traditional social networks have disintegrated. Finally, we end with some concluding remarks.
Theoretical Framework
To elaborate on two conceptual themes: the moral economy, and the duality of the market.
Moral Economy
Various writers (such as Thompson 1971; Habermas 1987; Bourdieu 1999) point out that individuals do not merely work and consume, they also judge and evaluate how well existing economic relations and practice correspond to their sense of fairness and justice. Indeed, the controversy over the market economy (see Hirschman 1992; Slater and Tonkiss 2001) is not merely a matter of income and wealth inequalities (i.e., the poor being disgruntled about their level of income), but also an issue of conflicting values and ethics (O'Neill 1998; Booth 1994; Ray and Sayer 1999; Keat and Abercrombie 1991). The term 'moral economy' cautions us against a blanket condemnation of the market, since any critique implies feasible alternative ways of co-ordinating economic practices (Sayer 1995). Furthermore, as Walzer (1983) and Keat (2000) argue, the boundaries of the market require both technical and moral judgements about legitimate market relations; in particular, using market logic to organise social practices. Quite simply, the market is neither all good nor all bad. It is better at delivering a particular range of things under certain conditions, but inappropriate for other things under different conditions. For example, we may raise no moral objections to the commodification of clothes, though we may be concerned when education becomes marketised. 
To suggest that an economy is morally embedded does not exclude other forms of embeddedness, but contributes to the debate on the nature of the social embeddedness of economic activities. Other accounts offer their own one-sided abstraction of the economy in relation to society and culture. For instance, some writers, such as du Gay (2002) and Hall (1997), argue that the economy has become ‘culturally stylised’, or aestheticised. By this they mean two things: first, more cultural goods (e.g., music, literature, fashion, films and sports) are produced or mediated through the market; and, second, production systems have become sensitive to people’s work meanings. For example, arm’s length market relations have given way to embedded, high trust economic practices. 
Granovetter (1985) and Smelser and Swedberg (1994) point to another form of social embeddedness, reflecting social structures (such as gender and ethnicity), personal and group habits, and social norms and conventions. Writers of the Regulation School (for a good survey see Jessop 1990) argue that the economy remains stable and legitimate because political actors and institutions attempt to diffuse any crises arising from the inherent contradictions of capitalism. Nevertheless, Sayer (2000a) points out that there is a tendency to ignore moral influences on social life, usually by interpreting them either as merely subjective and emotive, or in instrumental, power-based terms. By employing the term 'moral economy', Sayer wishes to counter this tendency and suggest how 'the economy embodies norms, conventions, tacit understanding, and ‘constitutive rules’ regarding the responsibilities and rights of individuals and institutions with respect to others and regarding the nature and qualities of goods, services and environment.' (2000a: 79). Furthermore, O'Neill (1998) argues that norms and conventions of a civil society are essential for market forces to operate. Clearly these approaches to social embeddedness dismiss any notion that the economy has become 'disembedded' (see Polanyi 1944), standing aloof and removed from society and culture. Indeed, many commentators (see Pickles and Smith 1998) suggest a 'soviet-shackles thesis': residuals of soviet culture (such as nomenklatura and communal attachments) in many post-socialist societies hinder a successful market revolution; i.e., markets are too weak to overcome the embedded social and political relationships and practices, and to transform society.
In short, in making moral judgements, individuals help to define the limits of market exchange (i.e., the appropriateness of market logic), and a sense of dispossession, frustration and cynicism can emerge when existing morally embedded activities become targets of moneymaking and profiteering (Thompson 1971; Wolfe 1989; Booth 1994). Interestingly, our respondents often describe this process as 'corruption' (see also Cokgezen 2004). Indeed, Andvig (2002) argues that the breakdown in previous conventions and rules governing the boundaries of social activities in post-socialist societies has resulted in bribery becoming more acceptable. While we do not aim to analyse the concept of 'corruption' per se, it is significant that individuals identify how proper behaviour and ethical practices have become strained under the yoke of the market system. It is worth noting that neo-classical economists also recognise market boundaries, but only in terms of 'market failures', such as free riding as in the proverbial example of the lighthouse.
To be clear, the market sphere possesses it own moral values, and undoubtedly re-constructs the social landscape, prioritising individual liberty, personal choice and private autonomy (see O'Neill 1998; Slater and Tonkiss 2001). However, as Walzer (1983) points out, market dominance and imperialism can mean moral homogeneity and a lack of plural values. As we shall see, while in post-socialist countries, individuals appreciate the personal freedom to purchase food items, they challenge and deride the application of private consumption of other social goods such as medical treatment where social care and protection matter (Doyal and Gough 1991).
Duality of markets
In a moral economy, the market has significant positive effects on social attitudes and relations. As Hirschman (1982) notes, Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment advocated the market as a positive moral force, liberating traditional ties from their oppressive obligations, and cultivating and rewarding reason and interests over passions and emotions. Early defenders of the market system argued that it had a ‘civilising effect’, reducing the power of the sovereign, encouraging individuals and nations to be industrious, being attentive to one another’s needs, and cultivating a reputation for fair dealing, so as not to damage their credit-worthiness and market position. Similarly, Simmel (1955) argues that commerce is a powerful socialising and moralising agent that brings many non-material improvements to society even though a bit of double-dealing may have to be accepted into the bargain. He recognises that competition can have a civilising effect on social relationships, facilitating politeness and civic values - though motivated by love of money:
Innumerable times [competition] achieves what usually only love can do: the divination of the innermost wishes of the other, even before he becomes aware of them. Antagonistic tension with his competitor sharpens the businessman’s sensitivity to the tendencies of the public, even to the point of clairvoyance, in respect to future changes in the public’s tastes, fashions, interests . . . Modern competition is described as the fight of all against all, but at the same time it is the fight for all. 
(1955: 179)
Additionally, a key political and moral feature of the market is its alleged neutrality; i.e., its tendency to operate regardless of individual's identities, or, indeed, regardless of their reasons for acting as they do (Sayer 1995; Keat 2000). Money is abstract and neutral (one person’s money is as good as the next’s), and the logic of the market is that all that matters is what is offered for sale and its price. Sayer (2000b) notes that the social characteristics of individuals are irrelevant since in advanced social division of labour, markets operate largely under conditions of ignorance of how products are produced and sold, and who works and trades for whom. However, market indifference is shockingly well understood in post-socialist societies when considering matters of education and policing, and is a root of moral concern, as we shall soon see. Under competitive market conditions any stigmatisation of social identity in the marketplace (e.g., ageism) is not an inherent element of the market, but occurs for reason of economic exploitability (e.g., higher revenue). Though again, market disinterestedness comes to be a source of discontent as social ties fail to temper the economic logic.
There is a flipside to market neutrality and disembeddedness. Evidently, the market forces have powerful disembedding effects; i.e. ‘lifting-out’ economic relations from existing social relations (Sayer 1995). Simultaneously, social relations are re-embedded, as Marx notes:
Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the [capitalist society] from earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. . . . The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the [capitalist] over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. 
[Our emphasis.] (1978: 476)
In other words, economic processes do not break permanently free from embedding. Rather they are re-embedded in new ways and places, perhaps in more instrumental and oppressive ways. While Polanyi (1944) recognises how the market economy becomes re-embedded, the market still tends to erode collective sense of values, valorise individualism, and threaten communal values, such as family and communal ideals and commitment, love and devotion and responsibilities and duties. Bourdieu also notes that the market system, in particular neo-liberalism, corrodes the moral imagination: 
[The] imposition of commercial values [has two trends]. First is the destruction of all collective institutions capable of counteracting the effects of the infernal machine, primarily those of the state, repository of all the universal values associated with the idea of the public realm. Second is the imposition everywhere . . . of that sort of moral Darwinism that . . . institutes the struggle of all against all and cynicism as the norm of all action and behaviour.
[1998: 5]
Similarly, we note the way in which market forces affect intimate and personal relationships, such as friendship and kinship, in Kyrgyzstan. Family, friends, relatives and neighbours are not immune to the way in which material culture is produced and consumed, as the price system, a structure of opportunity costs, influences how people value their time and resources (see Dudwick, Gomart, Marc and Kuehnast 2002). In their study of social networks in Kyrgyzstan during the transition to a market economy, Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002) note,
Ten years ago, the question of whether a hundred friends are better than a hundred roubles in post-communist Kyrgyz Republic would have been largely rhetorical. In keeping with the sense of this proverb, answers would have most likely have confirmed the superior importance of 'connections' over cash. Today, however, answers to this question are no longer so predictable. . . . In contrast to the situation during the Soviet era, money has become a key mechanism for establishing and mobilising networks.
[2002: 52; 66]
Informal networks are re-produced through life-cycle celebrations (such as births and weddings), cultural festivals, national holidays and social gatherings (e.g., trips to the mountains), as they help to nurture, foster and develop networks through the reciprocal exchange of gifts, information, advice, favours, money and services (see Davis 1992). Through such reciprocity, individuals establish and strengthen their belonging to families, relatives, friends and neighbours. Yet giving a gift, doing a favour or lending some money can be expensive, and can create indebtedness on the part of the recipient. Commonly, to avoid social embarrassment and financial difficulties, the poor withdraw from celebrations and social gatherings, and in the process they lose their sense of identity, connectedness with the community, and social support. In some cases, to avoid inter-household distribution, newly rich relatives and friends exclude the poor households from celebrations and social gatherings, as they assess the financial implications of maintaining relationships with poor relatives and friends (see Dudwick, Gomart, Marc and Kuehnast 2002).
While theoretically the market has both liberating and oppressing tendencies, it is a matter of empirical investigation on how individuals make judgements about the effects of the market on other social spheres, understanding the market boundaries and their legitimacy. We will suggest that in more intimate social spheres (such as family and friendship) norms, conventions and rules of responsibilities and obligations of individuals and institutions have been battered and bruised, though largely intact; while in other spheres (such as kinship and policing), they have been severely damaged.
To sum up, the moral economy points to how society should be organised, using different principles such as the economic exchange, social obligations and public laws. With the advent of the market economy, the boundaries of the market sphere have expanded, encroaching upon other social spheres. While individuals appreciate some degree of market freedom and choice, they are also morally appalled and outraged at how the market has 'corrupted' various social spheres, in particular the medical sphere, where state employed doctors and nurses are accused of being corrupt for demanding payment for their services. 
Research Design and Methods
Any qualitative research project involves a combination of strategy, pragmatism and expediency, and this is definitely the case for post-socialist countries in Central Asia. Our study was conducted in an environment where sociology is a relatively new discipline, its research tools poorly understood, and individuals are suspicious of being asked questions in public (see the Central Asia Resource Centre 2002). Indeed, conducting open-ended interviews was something of an achievement. However, the study was beset with problems that required us to take practical decisions, and eventually leading to additional interviews.
As the aim of the project was to understand how individuals experienced and understood the transition to market economy, we deliberately chose respondents from a broad spectrum of occupations, including a taxi driver, a sex-worker, and two house-workers. Additionally, as we wanted our interviewees to compare and assess the changes in their society, they all had some experience of the Soviet planned economy. 
Obviously, the interviews had to be conducted in Russian, and although one of the authors' skills in Russian was intermediate, it was not adequate, even with the assistance of a translator. Consequentially, we decided to use five highly educated social science lecturers from a local university to carry out the interviews in Russian. They possessed some research experience in collecting data, using a wide range of research methods. We provided further training for them, raising their awareness of the project's theoretical themes, and refreshing their skills in semi-structured interviews. In addition to some written guidelines and a workshop, we held one-to-one meetings with them, alerting them to the main points of the research, discussing the interview plan, and giving useful practical tips.
The research assistants interviewed 23 respondents from various professional and non-professional backgrounds: a doctor, two police officers, a sex-worker, a lecturer, two lawyers, a school teacher, an accountant, an office worker, a factory cleaner, two NGO workers, a farmer, a sales assistant, two housewives, a café worker, a sports trainer, a journalist and two businesspeople. All the interviews were tape-recorded, and despite some initial concerns, all the respondents were re-assured about confidentiality once the aims of the study were explained. On average, each interview lasted for 50-70 minutes. In selecting their respondents the research assistants first contacted known acquaintances, and if that did not yield any results, they cold-called individuals at their workplace. We were advised to pay, or give a gift to interviewees for giving up their time for the interview, so the assistants paid them a sum appropriate to their occupation. The research assistants transcribed the interviews into Russian, which were then translated into English by two highly professional translators.
While much of the interview data was useful, it was clear that at times the interviewers neglected to probe, not paying enough attention to asking additional questions to delve further into the topic, not grasping the opportunities during their interviews for detailed information, and not 'following' the interviewer (May 2001). Moreover, on a key area of the research (namely, the professional-client relationship), we had insufficient data. During the data collection process, we were unaware of these shortfalls, and it was only at the end, when the interviews were translated into English, that we realised these problems.
We decided to undertake a further ten interviews of workers from a range of professional fields. We employed a recent sociology graduate, who had similar experience in conducting qualitative research. We trained him over a period of three weeks, detailing how to prepare for each interview, and how to prompt and probe the interviewees. In addition, we monitored the quality of his interviews by asking him to send his first interview for inspection. The assistant was clear on the research themes and research techniques, and conducted a further nine interviews. These interviews filled the gaps left from the first cohort of interviews, and provided additional depth. 
Discussion
We discuss our findings in two parts. The first section details how the respondents understand some of the positive effects of the market system, in particular its liberating and civilising effects on social relations and practices. In the second part, we explore the ways in which the interviewees negatively regard the expansion of the market sphere, especially its effect on the public space and intimate relationships.
Questioning the Liberating and Civilising Effects
The 'civilising thesis' (whose proponents include Adam Smith, Scottish Enlightenment thinkers and Simmel) suggests that commerce acts as a civilising and moralising agent: in the process of trading, individuals learn to be honest, prudent, deliberate and careful, so as not to damage their credit-worthiness and reputation (see Hirschman 1982). In effect, compared to the controlled and planned economy, where people act out of passion and obedience (i.e., thoughtlessness), the market society curbs and constrains such behaviour, so that individuals can identify and pursue their 'interests'. Certainly, the market liberates the individual from their feudal-like bonds and obligations. 
Early liberal advocates, such as Adam Smith, argue that the social change from feudalism to the market economy creates liberating effects, as interests dominate passions. Proponents of the market system rightly identify two key aspects of the social transformation of the society: economic freedom of work and a consumer-friendly production. Under a planned economy, decisions about production and employment are taken out of the hands of the individuals, as the central authority dictates how resources are to be used, and usually for military uses. The market system structures individuals to become more responsible and self-managing; indeed the liberalisation of the market offers values of economic choice and freedom.
If before employment was found through the university, now one chooses the way which will enable livelihood. The positive side – if before there was a limit to how much could be earned like 130 roubles per month, now one chooses one's own limit and more opportunities are open. (Irina, an accountant)
. . . before the market economy our planned economy and the ideology limited people, now a person can choose his specialisation, a person has the right to live where he chooses, either go to Russia or abroad, the road is open in that respect. (Maksatbek, a large businessman)
Let's take housing in the Soviet period. Each person was entitled to 1 sq. metre of housing. . . . And now I can improve my housing, for example, I can buy the apartment I like and I can design it the way I want it. Now I have the housing conditions I want, for example, I can buy the apartment I like and do with it what I want and nobody will dictate me what design to have and how many metres of space to have. (Aida, a lawyer)
Most respondents recognised that real markets, such as the labour market, actually limit the formal nature of economic freedom and choice (White 1993; Harriss-White 1996). Furthermore, as Rose (1992) argues, the market disciplines individuals to become more self-regulating, shaping their bodies to the needs of the market. As Salamat, a senior police officer said,
There are those unemployed who stand for hours at the Molodaya Gvardiya Street waiting for a job. According to our survey, these people have degrees, and their situation forces them to be a labourer just to earn for a loaf of bread. . . . The market tries to build up infrastructures for its own benefit, but the people stay with nothing. . . . We do not choose; the market chooses us.
Rightly, several writers (such as Hirschman 1982) claim that the market system has a tendency to civilise social relations, since it punishes those who are likely to cheat.
Now we have something close to civilised business, but earlier everybody was ready to deceive others, even his mother, for the sake of profit. . . . Now the market dictates different conditions and a reliable partner means a lot. Earlier, everybody thought only about himself and lived by only one day; now people think about future, about the image. If you show yourself to be unreliable, then you are as good as dead: no partners, no reputation. (Aida, a lawyer)
Furthermore, businesses are profit-motivated to get close to the human values and desires (Simmel 1955). As Irina, an accountant said,
. . . the success of our firm depends on the extent to which every one of us tried to value the human culture more than the money. Above all we succeeded by guessing wishes and satisfying them.
Yet the market can equally facilitate a flourishing culture of dishonesty and corrupt practices. Markets are not only formally regulated by price signals, but also socially embedded (Granovetter 1985). Of course social embeddedness may not be cosy, softening the rough blows of the market, but corrupt, reinforcing the exploitative nature of the unequal power relations in the economy. Many respondents express the corrupt nature of real markets, riddled with bribes and social connections. 
Market relations describe everything: if you don't give a bribe, you won't find a good job. When my husband was getting his job, my older brother gave away his colt to help him with his job. We do not regret we gave away the horse. (Gulzat, a housewife)
My friends make offers to work - these are businesses of my friends and acquaintances; if you don't have friends, it's hard to find a job. I had problems opening my business, and then I gave a bribe. You understand and know yourself very well that even if you have a certificate, it's difficult to get a job without friends; you know the system - tribalism. (Marina, a lawyer)
My sons have good jobs: one works in a bank and the other - in the international organisation. I gave a bribe to arrange workplaces for them. Don't be surprised - international organisations also take bribes. (Camilla, a doctor)
. . . it is impossible to be absolutely honest in our current condition - otherwise, you can go bankrupt. People living well are those who were able to grab resources in time and to lie, to become owners, and to make money. (Tanya, a housewife to a businessman)
Again several writers (such as Keat 2000; Sayer 1995) argue that markets have an inherent tendency to be identity-blind, since what matters is the colour of the money, and not their skin colour or status. Some liberals (such as Hayek 1978) take this claim further and state that the market system promises formal equality between the different social strata of society, and an equal chance of success for all; indeed, success is a matter of luck.
There are more opportunities to live better lives, to provide oneself with a good apartment, furniture, and to afford holiday and rest at Issyk-Kul Lake. (Tanya, a housewife)
Yet real markets are structured in favour of those who possess various forms of social assets such as economic and symbolic capitals (White 1993; Ram 1994). Unsurprisingly, the market privileges the capitalist class, and discriminates against the vast majority of the people.
Salamat (a police officer): Definitely. I think, the elite only can accept the market economy and the exchange relations, but the majority cannot.
Interviewer: From your point of view, who are the elite?
Salamat: I mean those who are ready to survive; businessmen have integrated in the market economy, but how can the handicapped people or unemployed accept the market economy when they are penniless. The market economy should integrate everybody: a businessman and a pensioner. Though, we have stratification.
It only had good influence on some people, who were able to arrange good things for themselves, who started businesses in time or traded, while the majority of people are unemployed and cannot find jobs. (Sergey, a café worker)
Certainly there is a fundamental limitation to the economic arguments put forward by market liberals, suggesting a transition to the market economy. While the market-bias perspective of the economy did much to correct the production-bias perspective, an undue emphasis on the market system can only lead to future economic problems. For instance, Keynesians pointedly argue the market system works well when there is enough employment to fuel the consumer demand. Several respondents recognise the double-edged sword of market liberalisation and the weaknesses of the market economy. 
Kyrgyzstan is turning into a big bazaar with goods from near and far, and with that there are no real chances of reviving our own industrial output. (Julia, a lecturer)
[During the Soviet times], there was an absence of groceries and industrial goods, in order to buy footwear, and we had to find friends - this was normal practice. Or on the eve of holidays, special stores would be closed to serve the cream of the society. But, now I can purchase those items in any kiosk (small shop). I give my total support to the system in this respect, though it is another matter when people do not have the money to buy goods, or to support their children. We have a new puzzle: in the past, we had the money, but there were no goods to buy, and now we have the goods, but no money to buy them. We are in the extreme. (Asel, a NGO director)
The markets cannot exist on their own, without industry and production. That is why the market economy can't be established. (Salamat, a police officer)
Clearly the respondents recognised some of the moral gains from the introduction of the market system. Choice and economic freedom are key values, though they identify the double-edged nature of those values in terms of instability and uncertainty. Equally, the interviewees are aware of the formal promises, hopes and ideals of the market; though their understanding has been conditioned by their real-life experiences. Indeed, many have become rather cynical of market advocates, promising them more economic choice, freedom and equality - though, most do not want to return to the planned economy of the Soviet Union. Their sense of being entrapped further fuels their anger and frustration with the free market rhetoric.
Corrupting and Destructive Effects




In addition, the market can threaten individuals' sense of moral values and norms by conditioning them to view social relations and practices in instrumental ways (see Habermas 1987 Humphrey 2002). In particular, individuals fix themselves on accumulating capital rather than addressing themselves to the aim of the creation of such wealth (Booth 1994). First we examine the market effects on the economy and public goods, and then discuss its effects on intimate and personal relationships. 
a) The corrosion of the public space
The market tends to threaten the competitiveness and stability of a market-based society since it under-invests in key sectors such policing, health and education (Jessop 2002). Indeed, as the boundaries of the market sphere expand, they undermine existing ways of delivering social goods (Walzer 1983). Unsurprisingly, all the respondents are scornful of the expansion of the market, mocking the logic of the organising principle of the market and its ethical effects.
In the market economy, the money has become the only value for the majority of the people, the quality of life has sharply changed. For a small pension, criminals will kill pensioners. Everything is taken to the market for sale, from World War II and Afghanistan War military awards to making one's own little children work. . . . We live in a strange time of private capital accumulation, social permissiveness and no corporal punishment. Money and contacts have become the measure of the social relationships in our society. (Julia, a lecturer)
Everyone thinks that education is a paid service. So is health care. Now, if we go on like this, we'll be paying for being born, since life itself is a service. If we charge money for everything, life will become absurd. (Elena, a UN coordinator)
I valued collectivism, while market economy made me understand that every person is an individual. . . . We have enclosed ourselves within the borders of our state. (Irina, an accountant)
In contrast to the planned economy, the market price system is volatile, communicating how resources should be re-allocated in order to pursue profits. In part this is an advantage as it may reflect changing consumer desires and wants. However, there are negative implications as the production system and labour market are less malleable (Hodgson 1988). Many respondents suggest that the labour market forced many people to work in non-specialised jobs for low wages, so struggling to survive.
Before 1991 the system of distribution existed. There was stability and a guarantee of a job. Now such employment guarantee does not exist and it is hard to find a job. Before the state provided jobs. Even if you can find a job related to your education, it is low paid. It doesn't allow you to provide for your family. (Gulzat, a housewife)
Besides there's practically no work except to go to the market and people had to look for something or begin to sell something. They try to work in other spheres, which is close to their work skills; for example, if a person is a builder and he works as a driver—this is possible, but if a person was a turner or a locksmith and he is forced to trade—this is hard. A person can reorient himself, but it does not happen often and it takes more than 1 or 2 years—it takes about 5 years. . . . At the moment everybody has 'to tune up' to survive, people think and try to find the way out. I think many will succeed. Some, of course, lose heart. (Salamat, a police officer)




It should also be noted that the embedded culture of paying for public services has alerted some writers (see Mackintosh 1997; O'Neill 1998) to the possibility of a lack of professionalism and ethics, endangering the well being of the society. Walzer (1983) and Andvig (2002) point to a sense of moral outrage at the expansion of the market boundaries as the market system begins to 'corrupt' other organising principles, countering any positive affects of the competitive market to civilise the social relations. 
All the interviewees comment on how the market system has compromised key public institutions. Even the police officers in our study admit that their police system, supposedly organised around the idea of upholding and maintaining public law and order and providing security, is corrupt.
Natalya (a police officer): The militia work mostly for money now. Offenders may pay the militia and be released.  It works very successfully. You can bribe anyone. There are very few honest people. I wish these people would think about the area of their activities and their obligations. The militia should protect people from offenders, and not promote an increase in their number. 
Interviewer: Why do you think those who work in the militia changed?
Natalya: They have their own families that they need to feed. That's why they take bribes. Maybe, if their salary were bigger, they would be taking fewer bribes. 
We are not ashamed to say something like, 'He is a police officer'. This implies that this person has a salary of about 50 dollars, but he takes bribes, humiliates others, and wrongs them just to have 500 dollars a month. He does his utmost to have this money. . . . [During the Soviet times] the authorities were not perfect, but people believed in the authorities. They knew that if you went to a militia station and submitted a complaint, they'd interfere and do something. Today no one trusts the militia, because they know it is the most corrupt part of the government. (Elena, a UN coordinator)
Equally, education has become a site of struggle for ethical behaviour. In her research paper thesis, Romanchuk (2002) describes the extent of corruption and bribe taking in higher education in Bishkek,
The majority of universities and professors are into a bribery scandal: they sell exams to students and turn everything they can into material gains. . . . At the university, Altinay, as well as many others, has become a regular customer: she gets what she pays for, 200 soms for a grade ‘A’. Bribes are also receivable in kind: for example, a university professor asks students in his class to provide him with a sack of potatoes or sugar if they want to successfully pass the oral examination.
[2002: 2]
A director of one of the universities told Romanchuk that universities have little option but to ‘sell’ degrees given the lack of public funds.
The state, which committed itself to financing the universities, has not been doing this for a long time even at a minimal level. So the universities have to show miracles of commercial inventiveness. The government is to be blamed for failing to fund universities, and the latter are forced to seek money elsewhere. In our university almost 90 percent of its students pay for their studies. With a little support from the government universities largely depend on this money, and also cannot refuse to ‘sell’ diplomas to some students. 
[2002: 6]
In our study, several respondents express how the integrity of education, based on the organising principle of academic worthiness, honesty and merit, has been undermined, 
There is an expression that you cannot buy an education; you only get an education, and when a person gets an education, they don't pay for it, they just get it. And the fact that our education system is now paid is a deterrent to those who want to get an education . . . If you have money and no wits, you can always buy a diploma.  This is the most horrible thing. (Elena, a UN coordinator responsible for educational projects)
You pay for all exams. Knowledge matters little. If you pay, you will pass your exam, and if you don't, you will fail. For the most part, knowledge makes no difference. Money rules. (Natalya, a police officer commenting on her daughter's experience at school)
. . . there is a number of students, who without attending any examination sessions get their grades for the set price, recently volunteers of our organisation told me that it costs I,500 soms to pass exams with grade 5 (excellent), 1,000 soms for the grade 4 (good), 500 soms for the grade 3 (satisfactory) in [a local] university, one does not even have to study, he just pays the bill and gets the grades, so how can we discuss the quality at all? On the other hand, I know that these graduates will obtain good jobs as the syndrome of family relations is well developed and is efficient. (Asel, a NGO director, outlining a tariff for different grades)
However, a couple of respondents express some positive aspects of having money, freeing their children from academic rigour. Gulnur, a sex-worker expresses this thought,
It depends on how to perceive it. Not everyone can afford to pay. Those people who cannot pay for education will not get into a good school or a prestigious kindergarten. One positive fact is that if an individual has money, he/she need not worry about the child and teach him/her in any institution.
The corrosive culture of paying for public services is most visible in the medical sector. Ideally, medical services should be organised on the basis of need, providing to those who require life-saving and life-enhancing medical treatment and care. Mackintosh (1997) correctly identifies how the market discourse, and its instrumental culture, undermines medical professionalism and ethics as doctors and nurses prioritise commercial well being over the medical care of their patients. In December 2003, The Lancet reported allegations that the Kyrgyz medical academy had ‘coordinated an illegal trade in corpses and body parts’, revealing hidden corruption of the medical and prison staff (2003:1903). In our study, the respondents are equally appalled at the creeping and blatant aspects of the marketisation of hospitals and health clinics, leading those with little money to suffer.
Once my father was taken to the hospital, and his ward-mate could not pay for his medications. He had no relatives who could help him. He was forlorn there. Not a single nurse would help you until we called her a few times. We had to call the nurses all the time to tell them to feed the guy and give him medication, for he was virtually dying. This happens everywhere, and even in cancer hospitals. If a person has money to pay for medications, they will get them. If they are poor, they won't get any. (Natalya, a police officer)
My wife and I didn't need the doctors but then on 18 December, my mother in law died, and we spent a lot of money. The attitude of medical staff to us was that if you pay, you have everything; if you don't, you have nothing. It was very difficult, but my wife's sister helped, she came from Hungary. (Alex, a taxi driver)
If you need you can have an operation performed for money, and if you don't pay they won't do anything. If doctors had adequate salaries, they would not take bribes, then we wouldn't have corruption. (Natasha, an office cleaner)
Medical services should be free of charge, and if not, they should be done for the best, so that people are sure of their future health; and so that doctors remember Hypocrites' oath, so it's not like if you pay – we take care of you, if you don't pay- you can die, we don't care. (Dima, a small company worker)
However, some respondents express some degree of sympathy for a measure of medical marketisation, suggesting how patients-cum-customers could have greater choice and demand a higher quality of service. Gulzat, a housewife, said, 
If you have money, you'll get treated; if you have no money, you'd better get ready for your funeral. Doctors and nurses have forgotten about their oaths. [But] the positive is the emergence of private clinics. There is choice. 
Quality changed in commercial medical clinics, but not in all of them. People must be sure that if they pay money they have the right to get high-quality service, including medical. We got accustomed to getting everything free of charge. But the market is different, and there can't be free service on it. And not all medical workers understand that they work for money now. There are places where they are rude, but there are also places where they provide very high quality of service. (Gulnur, a sex worker)
As the market discourse of paying for things, being opportunistic and seeking profits entrenches itself into the individuals' ordinary lives, its currency has come to be seen, justly or unjustly, as regulating much of society. Indeed, individuals have begun to lose trust in public bodies, festering cynicism of their governing principles (see also World Bank 2002; Ilibezova et al. 2000; Andvig 2002). 
In equal measure, the interviewees are critical and damning of the influence of the paying culture on the legal system, the media and sports. 
Law-suits' costs are too expensive. How much does a divorce cost? One has to pay everywhere. We had a case when our acquaintances were getting divorced, and it was done during 5 minutes at a cost of USD 100. They paid and got their divorce. Our justice system has become a tradable marketplace. (Tanya, a housewife)
We have a variety of mass media. It's better to have many good media outlets than one bad one. The negative thing is, however, that newspapers can publish anything just to gain money. They can slander a person, if that brings profits. They can take this money and then apologise, unless they're too spoiled, of course. They will say, 'Oops, we were wrong.' But they already got the money. Or they can say they got that information from some unverified sources. (Elena, a UN coordinator)
In the Soviet era all these sports trainings were free, children were enrolled at schools. Now children would like to be engaged in sports, but parents have no money for that. It is frightful – children begin to drink vodka or smoke hashish. (Victor, a sports trainer)
As the instrumental nature of the market system becomes more visible in the economic lives of individuals and the public practices of institutions, most individuals challenge and deride the way in which the economy and the public space has unfolded, in particular how their organising principles have become 'corrupted' by the paying culture. As several writers (such as Mackintosh 1997; Keat and Abercrombie 1991; Keat 2000) identify, the market discourse tends to undermine professionalism and ethics, and, in the absence of counter-tendencies, individuals are prone to become cynical of and have little trust in public institutions.
b) Faltering social intimacy
Marx (1978) warns of the dangers of the market system, transforming persons into things, becoming tools for others. Equally, Habermas (1987) argues that the economic system comes to dominate cultural life: the means triumph over the ends, undermining moral values, eroding a collective sense of values. Individualism replaces, or at any rate threatens, communal values, such as family and communal ideals and commitment, love and devotion and responsibilities and duties. As Slater and Tonkiss (2001) note, social and personal relations cannot be immune from the market material culture: the instrumental mentality and opportunity costs come to affect everyday things, practices and relations. In their study of social networks in Kyrgyzstan, involving 21 focus groups and 105 interviews, Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002) find that in order to avoid further impoverishment, poor households deliberately withdraw from relationships with non-poor households to save face, as they are unable to afford to participate in the system of gift-giving. Likewise, in our study, many respondents comment on how relationships with friends and acquaintances have changed due to the increasing prices of things, economising on their social gatherings in an attempt to survive.
Tamara (a kiosk sales assistant): Before, we used to see each other more frequently at birthday parties, toys (celebrations), but now we meet only if they celebrate an anniversary. 
Interviewer: And why is that so?
Tamara: That is because living is more difficult now, before groceries were cheaper, everybody had a table full of food, now there is only white potatoes and bread, it is uncomfortable to visit others, they may start thinking we are visiting them too often, besides Kyrgyz people have large families.
Interviewer: Why would they think you are visiting them too often?
Tamara: It is just not right, of course we would not go there empty handed, in the past, people would not think you were visiting them too often, everybody visited each other frequently, they would travel all the way up to Naryn and sometimes even once a week, but now that is only 2-3 times a year only for toys (celebrations) or weddings.
Life has become more complex, inflation is growing, prices are rising, and people's relationships are becoming complex. Relationships between people were becoming tougher. . . . Everyone tries to think for themselves, without interest to problems of other people. . . . One only thinks about surviving in one situation or the other, and no longer thinking about spiritual development, only thinking about material values. (Sergey, a café worker)
Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002: 61) discovered that kin-based networks have disintegrated as the poor can no longer afford to participate in essential gift exchanges or life-cycle celebrations, nor maintain contact with family, relatives and acquaintances living in other parts of the country and abroad. Marina, a lawyer, expresses similar feelings concerning her relationships with relatives,
We've become closer to our close relatives and help each other materially and morally; but we've become more distant to our distant relatives because they live their own life, some of them live far away and it's expensive to visit with them. When we have big gatherings, not everybody comes—it is expensive too. . . . My children don't know many of our relatives; they do not recognise them when they run into then in the streets. It's difficult to socialise when you have no money. I'd be happy to socialise; they don't come to visit us as they probably have no money and you can't come and visit with empty hands; so they think.
However, as Wolfe (1989) notes, human values, moral responsibilities and social obligations are nurtured in the civil society, where they resist the influence both of the state and the market. Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002: 68) correctly note, 'Although gift exchange constitutes a significant portion of an ordinary household's annual expenditures, people strive to maintain this tradition because they know they must give in order to receive. As the Kyrgyz proverb, says Kattashpasa jakyn tuugan jat bolot (if you don't stay touch with your family, they will become strangers to you one day).' Several respondents express how their family obligations, as well social obligations to others, have not changed.
I come from a big family and we treat each other very well and are ready to help each other in different ways. For example, our mother will be 80 this year and we are preparing for it because we have obligations to one another. Sometimes it is help without the obligation to return. (Camilla, a doctor)
Natalya (a police officer): I have to help my daughter get a good education. I need to help her finish school successfully. I also need to pay her a great deal of attention. Sometimes, it is not possible. And yet I am sure my child has everything she needs.
Interviewer: Do you have any obligations to your parents?
Police officer: Yes. I buy everything they need in the house. I pay for utilities. It doesn't look like I don't care about my parents or relatives.
Family obligations and lifelong obligations—how can they change? I feel obliged to help them when they have problems and such obligations do not change—they are constant. They do not depend on the economy whatever form it may take. If you are a responsible person, you'll behave accordingly. No economy can change my relations with colleagues, relatives, and friends; at least, this is the case with me. (Olga, a self-employed businesswoman)
These are centuries old obligations that do not change during your lifetime. . . . Human values do not depend on Perestroika or on the market economy. Human values are something unchangeable, something that is forever. It is before all the rights, the right to live, if Allah created then the existence must be decent. (Maksatbek, a large businessman)
However, having to make ends meet in difficult economic conditions means that at times the family suffers.
My children do not see their father who works all day long. His status obliges him to work on weekends and holidays. Every day is a working day for him as there are no weekends and holidays in the transportation industry just as in the medical sector. He gives too little time to his family and children. (Tanya, a housewife)
For many individuals social gatherings and acts of social intimacy toward friends, family and relatives become increasingly difficult to sustain as the costs of undertaking such activities in terms of resources and time became more visible, and their opportunity costs rise as a result of increasing prices of things and limited personal budgets. Nevertheless, individuals feel a strong sense of responsibility toward family members, expressing how their obligations to them are heavily entrenched and not easily compromised. Indeed, this strong sense of commitment toward the family, unbowed by price signals and cost structures, marks the family sphere as a particularly exceptional institution (Finch and Mason 1996), resisting the organising principle of the market sphere. 
Conclusion
When Kyrgyzstan and other post-socialist countries committed themselves to the market economy, there was a huge optimism that the change would herald new times. Much of the early enthusiasm reflected the market liberals' 'civilising thesis': competitive market forces would liberate and socialise feudal-like relationships and practices. However, our study has shown a universal consensus challenging this thesis. The market system has created a huge level of poverty and unemployment in the economy (Narayan and Petesch 2002; Namazie 2002; Anderson and Pomfret 2000; World Bank 2000), 'corrupted' public bodies (Cokgezen 2004; Ilibezova et al. 2000; World Bank 2002) and weakened personal and close ties (Dudwick, Gomart, Marc and Kuehnast 2002; Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002). Indeed, the term 'corruption' has become a popular metaphor to describe the public space in moral decline. Unsurprisingly, individuals have become cynical and derisive of the mentality of 'paying for things', and, in particular, have come to lose trust in public authorities. They wish to 'roll back' the market, and believe that only the state could shore up the well being of the society against the battering tides of the market. In short, as Walzer (1983) points out, there have to be limits to the market.
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Table 1: What is corruption in Kyrgyzstan?
	Is it corruption?	Households (%)	Businesses (%)	Public Officials (%)
After a visit to a doctor, the doctor is given a box of chocolates	Definitely Yes	17	10	8
	Yes and No	27	22	28
	Definitely No	56	68	64
After a visit to a doctor, the doctor is given money (in addition to the official payments)	Definitely Yes	44	38	41
	Yes and No	32	41	35
	Definitely No	24	21	24
At the beginning of a visit to the doctor, the doctor is given a box of chocolates	Definitely Yes	33	24	27
	Yes and No	32	35	35
	Definitely No	35	42	38
At the beginning of a visit to the doctor, the doctor is given money (in addition to the official payments)	Definitely Yes	60	52	63
	Yes and No	25	33	25
	Definitely No	15	15	13
During a visit at the hospital, money (in addition to official payments), is offered to doctors and nurses to ensure proper care	Definitely Yes	58	42	50
	Yes and No	28	40	31
	Definitely No	14	18	19
During a visit at the hospital, money (in addition to the official payments) is requested by doctors and nurses to ensure proper care	Definitely Yes	81	81	82
	Yes and No	12	13	13
	Definitely No	7	6	5
A student gives a gift to a university professor in order to influence his grade	Definitely Yes	64	51	63
	Yes and No	28	36	27
	Definitely No	8	14	10
A company gives some gift or money (in addition to the official payments) to a government official to avoid waiting in a long line	Definitely Yes	83	77	80
	Yes and No	14	16	16
	Definitely No	4	7	3
A company gives some gift or money (in addition to the official payments) to a tax inspector to avoid paying more taxes	Definitely Yes	90	86	91
	Yes and No	8	9	6
	Definitely No	3	5	3
At the beginning of a court case, one of the parties to the suit gives the judge a gift	Definitely Yes	87	79	88
	Yes and No	10	16	8
	Definitely No	4	5	3
A traffic policeman fines someone for an infraction: the driver offers a smaller amount and indicates that no receipt is required	Definitely Yes	75	54	78
	Yes and No	22	36	17
	Definitely No	3	11	5
Source: World Bank 2002: 45


Table 2: Incidence of bribery in Kyrgyzstan
During the last 3 years, did you bribe (or were you extorted) when you had:	Businessmen(%)	Office workers(%)
To obtain a job/contract	63	40
To enrol your child in school	58	50
To enter into hospital	82	75
To obtain a flat	58	59
To obtain registration/residence permission	67	53
To obtain permission for land buying/building	77	73
To achieve an order for the implementation of any projects for governmental or municipal bodies	69	57
To pass customs procedures	97	88
To obtain a driving licence/register an automobile/have it mechanically examined	66	81
To break traffic rules and be arrested by policemen	100	100
Source: Adapted from Ilibezova et al. (2000)






